Section 167 - Criminal Procedure Code - 1898 (Judgements)

 

Section 167 - Criminal Procedure Code - 1898

(Judgements)

Citation Name : 2025 PCrLJ 148 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

Side Appellant : Mst. Sanam Javed

Side Opponent : Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, Gujranwala

Ss. 435, 439-A, 561-A & 167 ---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, 427, 431, 186, 148, 149, 505, 188 & 109---Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance (XXXI of 1960), S.16---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, use the criminal force or assault on public servant while he was performing his duty, causes damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, mischief by injury to a public road, bridge, river, or channel, obstructing a public servant in the performance of their duties, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly, creation or promotion of hatred, enmity, or ill-will between different groups, disobeying an order given by a public servant, abetment, dissemination of rumours, act of terrorism---Physical remand, extension in---Legality---Admittedly, trial in said case to the extent of some of the accused had been concluded, whereas, one of the nominated accused, who was declared proclaimed offender, was subsequently arrested on 08.05.2024 and thereafter on 30.05.2024, he got recorded his statement under S.337(1), cr.p.c , before the Area Magistrate, whereby he involved the petitioner along with certain other persons to the extent of abetment---It was stated at bar by the head of the Joint Investigating Team as well as Investigating Officer that except the said statement of the accomplice, there was no other incriminating material to connect the petitioner with the said case---Record showed that accomplice remained on physical remand for twenty two days before recording of such statement, therefore, it could not be said that he got recorded the statement voluntarily and without any coercion---If the statement of the accomplice was given weightage even then at the most it was a case of abetment against the petitioner and it was not understandable, for what purpose in the charge of abetment, physical remand of an accused was required---Only purpose of seeking remand of the petitioner was to prolong her custody---Such aspect had been overlooked by the trial Court while dealing with the request of physical remand of the petitioner and granted the physical remand in a mechanical manner---Allegedly, during the period of physical remand, petitioner got recovered a USB containing her videos and one mobile phone of her husband and from the transcripts of the videos available in the USB, it was alleged that the petitioner instigated the co-accused to commit the occurrence---First of all, it was to be noted that the petitioner was behind the bars since 10.05.2023 and admittedly her mobile phone was already taken into possession in case FIR No.96/23---Mobile phone which was allegedly recovered at the instance of the petitioner undisputedly belonged to her husband---Investigating Officer confirmed that the same was active when taken into possession, and when confronted how the same could be connected with the petitioner, prosecution submitted that during investigation petitioner admitted that she occasionally used the said mobile phone---Merely on the basis that petitioner occasionally used mobile phone of her husband, such mobile or the data contained therein could not be used against her---Even otherwise, from the said mobile phone no incriminating material connecting the petitioner with the alleged crime was recovered---Second piece of evidence procured by the Investigating Officer was the USB---Petitioner was continuously in custody of police on the basis of different criminal cases/ detention orders since 10.05.2023 and the FIR of the said case was also registered on the same date---Moreover, it was beyond comprehension that how the petitioner transferred the data of her social media accounts in the USB, when she was already in police custody---Even otherwise, transcript of the USB had been placed and bare perusal of the same showed that it was downloaded from Youtube and her other purported social media accounts, which were active since the day of the occurrence, therefore, it could safely be said that the USB was planted upon the petitioner just to create evidence against her in the case---No date and time of the purported videos of the petitioner was mentioned as such it could not be said with any degree of certainty that the same were prior or after the protest---Besides the above, Joint Investigating Team Head, in categorical terms admitted that mobile phone of any of the co-accused was not taken into possession, so as to confirm that on account of the instigation of the petitioner on social media forum, he/they committed the said occurrence---In such backdrop, Court was of the view that on the basis of evidence created/procured against the petitioner, she could not be connected with the alleged occurrence in any eventuality---Mala fide of the Investigating Officer was also apparent from the fact that in the so-called statement of the accomplice he named a number of persons who instigated him and other party members to commit the crime but he only caused the arrest of the petitioner and one other female and for the rest of the accused he did not give any weightage to the statement of the accomplice---In such view of the matter, it could safely be said that the statement of the accomplice was procured with the sole purpose to confine the petitioner as she had been released on bail in all other cases registered against her---Petition was allowed, in circumstances and the petitioner was discharged from the said case.

Citation Name : 2025 PCrLJ 48 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

Side Appellant : Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi

Side Opponent : State

Ss. 497(2) & 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 353, 186, 212, 506(ii), 172, 173, 174, 148 & 149---Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty, obstructing public servant in discharge of his public functions, harbouring offender, criminal intimidation, avoiding service of summons or other proceeding, preventing services of summons or other proceeding or preventing publication thereof, non-attendance in obedience to an order from public servant, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly---Pre-arrest bail, confirmation of---Further inquiry---Gist of allegations in FIR transpired that SI/SHO Police Station concerned along with police contingent approached the residence of the petitioner in order to effect his arrest in execution of arrest warrants issued by Court in a complaint dated 03.11.2022 under Ss.167 /173 of Elections Act, 2017 but faced resistance offered by a mob of 100/150 persons present outside the residence of the petitioner and thereby criminal force was used with intent to prevent or deter him from discharging his duty as public servant, and he was not allowed to effect arrest of the petitioner---Prosecution contended that it was done on the direction and instigation of the petitioner as reflected from a live press conference conducted by the petitioner in that respect later in the day---Prosecutor had submitted that accused had deliberately avoided the execution of warrants of arrest, therefore, committed offences mentioned in the FIR---However, it was apparent that sufficient material was not available on the record in support of allegations against the petitioner at present stage of the proceedings and propensity of police to take a shortcut by registering FIR instead of following the legal process was reflective of mala fide on their part, when law permitted them to file a report before the concerned judge with a complaint under Ss.172, 173, 174, P.P.C, against the petitioner for alleged disobedience to order of the Court---When an accused is arrested in execution of a warrant of arrest issued from outside jurisdiction, police is bound to produce the accused before the concerned Magistrate under S.86 of cr.p.c . for reporting his execution of duty in accordance with law and in such situation Sessions Judge is authorized to grant 'an interim post arrest bail' to the arrested accused, if the offences are non-bailable, on furnishing surety by the accused to appear before the Court concerned on the date fixed---Thus, it was apparent that very registration of FIR was result of mala fide against the petitioner probably due to political victimization---Mala fide being a state of mind cannot always be proved through direct evidence, and it is often to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case---While deciding pre-arrest bail application merits of the case can also be touched upon and question of further inquiry can be stretched at such stage as well---Apparently petitioner had made out a case for grant of pre-arrest bail on the touch stone of further inquiry---Petition was allowed and ad-interim pre-arrest bail already granted to the petitioner was confirmed, in circumstances.

Citation Name : 2024 MLD 1962 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT

Side Appellant : Hizbullah

Side Opponent : State

S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 377 & 34---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act (XXIII of 2013), S. 15---Juvenile Justice System Act (XXII of 2018), S. 6(3)---Unnatural offence, common intention, possession of unlicensed weapon---Bail, grant of---Juvenile accused---Petitioners were charged for committing sodomy with the complainant on gun point---Undeniably, the petitioners had been directly charged for the offence of sodomy upon the victim---Medical report of the victim was clear inasmuch as it showed a wedge sloped tear on anterior wall of anal canal, which prima facie indicated that penetration had taken place, which was enough for the commission of the offence---Mere fact that the Forensic Science Laboratory Report of the swabs was awaited was not sufficient to help create a scope of further inquiry---Delay in such like cases did not matter much for the simple reason that the honour of the victim and his family was involved---No one would ordinarily falsely level the charge of such an offence to invite social stigma such an offence tends to carry---An additional ground was the putting of the victim in fear of instant death through the use of the pistol by the petitioners---Thus, on merit, there existed a prima facie case against both the petitioners, therefore, they were not entitled to the concession of bail---However, petitioners raised the plea of juvenility as well---Medical report of the petitioner "S" reflected his age to be about 17 years, while the medical report of petitioner "H" revealed that he was about 16 years of age---Thus, both the petitioners were juveniles, as defined in S.2 of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018---However, no effort under S.8 of the Act, including the Judicial Magistrate before whom the petitioners were produced under S.167 , cr.p.c ., was made for determination of their juvenility---In the cards of arrest, the petitioner "H"was shown as 15/16, and the petitioner "S" as 16/17 years old---Court, thus, had to consider the cards of arrest and the medical reports as available material for the purpose of tentative assessment---Under subsection (3) of S.6 of the Act, for the minor and major offences a juvenile offender shall be treated as if accused of committing a bailable offence---However, under subsection (4) of the same provision, in the case of a heinous offence (carrying capital punishment), a juvenile over sixteen years of age may not be granted bail if there are reasonable grounds establishing prima facie connection with the alleged offence---Case of a juvenile offender of 16 years or below would be covered by subsection (3) of S.6 of the Act---For such reason, the petitioner "H" being 16 years old, stood entitled to bail on the ground of juvenility---Petitioner "S" being 17 and as such above 16, was refused bail being charged for a major offence---Petition was partially allowed.

Citation Name : 2024 YLR 1963 ISLAMABAD

Side Appellant : Iftikhar Ali Haideri

Side Opponent : State

Ss. 63, 167 , 169 & 561-A---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 392, 380 & 457---Robbery, theft in dwelling house, lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night in order to commit offence---Physical remand---Refusal---Scope---Physical remand of the accused was declined and he was discharged by the Magistrate---Validity---Presentation of the accused before the Judicial Magistrate would serve no purpose if the Magistrate is to blindly remand the accused in the custody of police for up to a period of fifteen days (i.e. the maximum period for which physical remand is permissible)---Thus, there is no reason why the fundamental right to liberty of an accused would be denied to him on the basis of bald allegations in a complaint that has taken the form of an FIR unless there is some incriminating material on the basis of which police authorities can satisfy the Judicial Magistrate that the accused is liable for an offence that requires his arrest for purposes of investigation---Section 63 of cr.p.c gives the Judicial Magistrate the power to pass a special order or discharge the accused where the material collected by police authorities up until such time is not such that implicates the accused or justifies his arrest and/or continued detention---Such order of discharge does not prohibit the police from continuing the investigation and collecting further evidence against the person who has been discharged---In view of the record produced before the Court,including the report of the SP Police stating that the complainant had lodged false FIRs, including present FIR, which formed the subject-matter of the instant case and the finding of the Judicial Magistrate that at the time of alleged occurrence the accused was in another city and not in his city and could therefore not have been involved with the occurrence, High Court was not convinced that the impugned order was unjust, unfair and unreasonable or otherwise qualified as colorable exercise of the administrative authority vested in the Judicial Magistrate under S.63 of cr.p.c .---Petition being without merit was dismissed.

Citation Name : 2024 MLD 799 ISLAMABAD

Side Appellant : Rizwan Ijaz

Side Opponent : Javed Akhtar

Ss. 302(b), 109 & 34---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 63 & 561-A---Qatl-i-amd, abetment, common intention---Accused discharged by Magistrate on the ground of deficient evidence---Legality---In the case in hand the two nominated accused were apprehended and were produced before the Magistrate for obtaining their physical remand---During the physical remand one motorcycle and a pistol were also recovered---First Information Report was registered on the statement of deceased, who succumbed to his injuries, and had specifically nominated the said arrested accused persons with specific roles---Relevancy of statement of the deceased and evidentiary value of the recovered articles would obviously be determined during trial by a competent court---However, the Magistrate instead of exercising powers under Section 167 , cr.p.c ., in respect of the request for physical remand, proceeded to release the arrested accused persons under Section 63 cr.p.c ., by holding that "no reasonable incriminating substances exist as against the accused persons"---Validity---Such observation was made by the Magistrate after reproducing in his order, the opinion of expert who had analyzed the video footage submitted before the Investigating Officer by the accused person in an attempt to establish the plea of alibi, which determination was otherwise not within his competence and domain---In the case in hand, the Police Officer did not recommend to the Magistrate that the accused be discharged on the ground of deficient evidence---In fact the police had submitted a request for further physical remand in view of substantial progress made during investigations in the criminal case---Furthermore, the contents of the FIR and the plea of alibi raised by the accused persons were yet to be considered by the trial in the light of evidence of the parties---Magistrate while passing order, proceeded in haste and ignored that the question of guilt and innocence of the accused persons was to be considered by the competent Trial Court---Magistrate ignored that such intricate disputed questions required recording of evidence, which could not have been resolved in his administrative capacity, particularly when he lacked jurisdiction to try the criminal case---Powers under S. 63, cr.p.c ., ought to be exercised in a case of justified arrest of the accused persons in absence of sufficient evidence as to their involvement in the criminal case, but in a case where the accused persons were specifically nominated (if proved during trial and recovery of the incriminating articles was effected subject to determination of evidentiary value during trial), then, prima facie, sufficient incriminating material was available on record for the Magistrate to have either granted or refused the physical remand as requested by the Police Officer---Magistrate should have left the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused persons to a Court competent to try the case after completion of the investigations---Magistrate by simply releasing the nominated accused persons under Section 63 cr.p.c . blocked further progress in the investigation of the criminal case---Order passed by the Magistrate was patently illegal on the face of it, thus, same was set aside the same by allowing the petition and Magistrate was directed to reconsider the request submitted by police for physical remand of the accused persons.

Citation Name : 2023 PCrLJ 1185 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

Side Appellant : MUHAMMAD ALAM KHILJI

Side Opponent : JUDGE ACCOUNTABILITY COURT

Ss. 5(o), 5(s) & 9---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 167 & 344---Corruption and corrupt practices---"Offence"---"Public at large"---Jurisdiction of Accountability Court---Scope---Bail, grant of---Petitioners were taken into custody by the National Accountability Bureau on the ground that they had committed an offense as defined in the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---While facing trial, the petitioners remained in judicial custody---In the meantime, an amendment was introduced in the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, which removed the petitioners from the jurisdiction of the Accountability Court---Accountability Court refused to exercise jurisdiction in the matter and directed the Bureau to produce the petitioners before the competent forum in time---Validity---Amendment in subsections (o) & (s) of S. 5 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, had removed the petitioners from the category of offenders under the Ordinance, as the alleged plundered amount was less than five hundred million rupees---Custody of the petitioners could be regulated in accordance with the mandate of S. 167 read with S. 344 of the cr.p.c ., but it would serve only a limited purpose of regulating the custody of the accused---It would not address the question of under which offense the accused had been kept in custody for an indefinite and unbridled period---No person could be left without remedy in any circumstance, especially when life and liberty were at stake---Constitutional petitions were allowed, the impugned orders were set aside, and the petitioners were released on bail.

Citation Name : 2023 PCrLJ 810 ISLAMABAD

Side Appellant : MUHAMMAD SHAHBAZ SHABEER

Side Opponent : ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE

S. 167 ---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 124-A, 131, 153, 153-A, 505, 506 & 109---Physical remand---Extension---Accused was arrested for committing offences of sedition, provocation of riots, public mischief and criminal intimidation, against members of armed forces---Physical custody of accused extended to investigating officer by Trial Court was maintained by Lower Appellate Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction---Validity---Lower Appellate Court had jurisdiction to hear revision petition against order under S. 167 , cr.p.c .---Remand was not to be allowed in a mechanical way nor refused on the basis of conjectures or surmises without application of mind---Such order was to be passed on the basis of material available on record including police diaries---Examination of police diaries led Lower Appellate Court to the conclusion that further 48 hours of remand in police custody was required---Investigating Officer also made reference to reasons for which physical custody was required which was to recover cellular phone from where the statement was allegedly read out by the accused---High Court declined to interfere in the order assailed, as the same did not suffer from any error of law---Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.

Citation Name : 2023 PCrLJ 305 ISLAMABAD

Side Appellant : JUNAID QAMAR

Side Opponent : SESSIONS JUDGE, WEST ISLAMABAD

Ss. 60, 61 & 167 ---Arrest---Transitory remand---Petitioner was aggrieved of his arrest by police in place "ICT" on the basis of FIR registered at place "M" and grant of transitory remand---Validity---In order to safeguard interest of a person so arrested, police officer under S. 60, cr.p.c . without unnecessary delay was to present a person arrested before Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case or before office incharge of a police station---No person under S. 61, cr.p.c . could be detained by police officer who was arrested without warrant for a period longer, under all circumstance of the case was reasonable and in absence of the order of Magistrate under S. 167 , cr.p.c . for more than twenty four hours exclusive of the time necessary for the journey from place of arrest to Court of Magistrate---Competent Magistrate in the case or incharge of police station was of place "M", arresting officer of Police Station at place "M" presented petitioner before Magistrate within whose jurisdiction petitioner was arrested on 5.7.2022 with the plea that transitory remand was granted which accordingly was done vide order dated 06-07-2022---Petitioner was presented within 24-hours and there was no violation of laws---Order granting transitory remand also met the requirement of relevant laws---High Court declined to interfere as petitioner failed to point out any illegality or transgression in jurisdiction of Magistrate---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Citation Name : 2022 SCMR 609 SUPREME-COURT

Side Appellant : Mst. KAINAT BIBI

Side Opponent : State

Ss. 167 (5) & 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 379, 380 & 381---Theft by female house maid---Bail, grant of---Offences alleged do not fall within the prohibitory clause of S. 497, cr.p.c .---Doors for release of accused, being a female with no past record, were statutorily wider and, thus, her continuous detention, was serving no useful purpose---Evidentiary value of the stolen gold ornaments, allegedly recovered on disclosure of the accused, could best be adjudged during the trial---Furthermore the accused was held in police custody in violation of S. 167 (5), cr.p.c .---Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was admitted to bail.

Citation Name : 2021 PLD 586 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

Side Appellant : MUHAMMAD UMAR

Side Opponent : State

Ss. 6 & 8---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) Ss. 167 & 497---Detention of juveniles accused of criminal offence(s)---Release of juvenile on bail---Guidelines and directions for police, prosecution and state functionaries for safeguarding juveniles accused of criminal offences---International human rights regime sought to protect children in conflict with law and the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 was enacted to provide criminal justice system for juveniles with special focus on disposal of cases through diversion and social reintegration of juvenile offenders---Such objectives were shared by international community, one of which was that children should be detained when absolutely necessary and for shortest period of time possible---Unique vulnerability of children deprived of their liberty required higher standards and broader safeguards to minimize use of detention and prevent ill-treatment in custody---High Court directed that the Provincial Inspector General of Police shall ensure that all cases involving juveniles were processed swiftly in accordance with law and challan was submitted within 14 days or at least interim challan in terms of proviso to S.173, cr.p.c . was submitted within such time; that Provincial Prosecutor General shall ensure that no delay in meeting the said timeline was occasioned by Prosecution Department and that Inspector General of Police and Prosecutor General shall immediately nominate designated officers who shall monitor submission of challans in cases involving juveniles on monthly basis; that disciplinary action should be taken against those responsible for causing delay in such cases and that juvenile cases should be on agenda of every meeting of Criminal Justice Coordination Committees constituted under Police Order, 2002 and such committees shall review progress of said cases and issue such directions and take such steps as may be necessary; and that all Trial Courts were to decide cases involving juveniles expeditiously and shall ensure that they were proceeded on day-to-day basis without grant of unnecessary adjournments and that every trial of a juvenile must be concluded within period of six months.

Citation Name : 2021 PLD 586 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

Side Appellant : MUHAMMAD UMAR

Side Opponent : State

Ss. 6 & 8---Penal Code (XLV of 1860) Ss. 302, 324, 337-F & 34---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) Ss. 167 & 497---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, ghayr-jaifah, common intention---Bail, grant of---Release of juvenile on bail---Delay in conclusion of trial due to determination of age of accused---Accused sought post-arrest bail, inter alia, on ground that he had been in detention for a period exceeding six months, and being a juvenile was entitled to bail per Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018---Contention of prosecution, however, was that delay occurred in determining as to whether accused was juvenile, and such application for determination of age was moved by him, making accused responsible for delay---Validity----Time spent by accused in obtaining declaration that he was a juvenile could not be counted to his disadvantage---Section 8(2) of Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 stipulated that an accused who appeared to be juvenile must be brought before a court under S.167 , cr.p.c . and court before granting detention, must record its findings on issue of accused's age---In present case, neither the police nor court performed such statutory duty---Accused's case fell within ambit of S.6(5) of Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 and he had been detained for a continuous period exceeding six months, and trial had not been concluded, and such delay was not attributable to him---Accused was therefore admitted to post-arrest bail, accordingly.

Citation Name : 2021 PCrLJ 1393 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

Side Appellant : MUZAFFAR AHMAD

Side Opponent : State

Ss. 63, 173, 167 & 561-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders Vol. III Chapter 11, Part-B, R. 6---Discharge of apprehended person on order of Magistrate----Nature of order of discharge under S. 63, cr.p.c .---Adjudication by Judicial Magistrate under S. 63, cr.p.c .---Scope---Cancellation of a case was totally different from discharge of an accused person as former terminated further investigation by police while latter did not---Word "discharge" used in S. 173, cr.p.c . was used in a different sense as it was used in respect of bond, while the same was used in S. 63, cr.p.c . in respect of arrest---High Court observed that while making order for discharge under S. 63, cr.p.c ., Magistrate must his mind to facts and circumstances of a case and should be honest fair and just to accused as well as prosecution; and inter alia, take into consideration nature of allegation(s) against accused, evidence collected or likely to be collected and defence plea of accused as well as any evidence accused had produced in respect thereof and additionally should examine police diaries and record reasons for his opinion---Validity of an order for discharge of an accused did not depend on period such accused had been in custody of police and time taken by police to investigate a case however, Magistrate should not act in haste and see to it that his order for discharge did not nip the prosecution case---Such order for discharge of an accused was an administrative and not judicial order and was not amenable to revisional jurisdiction but in appropriate cases could be challenged under S. 561-A, cr.p.c . or through Constitutional petition seeking writ of certiorari; which was to be a check against arbitrariness on Magistrate's part---Subject to R. 6 of Rules and Orders of the Lahore High Court, Vol. III Chapter 11 Part-B, Magistrate could discharge an accused even suo motu when such accused was produced before him for remand under S. 167 , cr.p.c .

Citation Name : 2021 PCrLJ 293 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

Side Appellant : MUNIR AFTAB

Side Opponent : State

Ss. 167 , 173 & 344--- Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours---Remand, grant of--- Adding / deleting of offence(s)---Report of Police Officer---Nature of powers of Magistrate under S. 167 , cr.p.c .----Scope----At time of remand, Magistrate could direct Investigating Officer to add, delete or substitute an offence mentioned in FIR if circumstances so warranted, however he / she could not ask the Station House Officer (SHO) to submit report under S. 173, cr.p.c . in a particular manner, that is, against a person he/she desires, or in respect of such offence(s) he / she wished for.

Citation Name : 2021 PCrLJ 293 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

Side Appellant : MUNIR AFTAB

Side Opponent : State

Ss. 561-A & 167 ---First Information Report---Police was to investigate the FIR and collect evidence---Court had no authority to interfere in the proceedings by Police unless those were mala fide or without jurisdiction---High Court could not invoke S. 561-A, cr.p.c ., to issue directions to the Investigators.

Citation Name : 2020 PCrLJ 627 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

Side Appellant : TAJAMMUL ABBAS

Side Opponent : State

Ss. 8, 4 & 2(b)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 167 ---Age determination of---Juvenile court---Procedure when investigation cannot be completed within twenty-four hours---Scope---Section 2(b) of Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 defines a child as a person who at the time of commission of offence has not attained the age of 18 years---Juvenile Court is established under S. 4 of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 to deal with such cases---Certain privileges are granted to "child"-accused through Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 some of which pertain to arrest, bail, release on probation and prohibition of inflicting capital sentence, etc---Section 8 of Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 obligates the Officer Incharge of Police Station or the Investigating Officer to determine the acclaimed age of juvenile from his birth certificate, educational certificates or any other relevant document from the very inception of investigation---Juvenile is to be medically examined only if there is no other trustworthy documentary proof in support of his age plea---Findings about the age of an accused who physically appears to be a juvenile is to be given by the court before whom he is brought under S. 167 , cr.p.c . and that too before granting his further detention---Such findings are to be based on the record made available before the court including report prepared by the police officer or the medical examination report, if any.